The Korean War offers lessons for a fragile US-Iran ceasefire

Opinion>Opinions - National Security The views expressed by contributors are their own and not the view of The Hill The Korean War offers lessons for a fragile US-Iran ceasefire Comments: by Harlan Ullman, opinion contributor - 06/29/26 12:30 PM ET Comments: Link copied by Harlan Ullman, opinion contributor - 06/29/26 12:30 PM ET Comments: Link copied Title: Lebanon Israel Iran War Image ID: 26166489966832 Article: A Lebanese soldier patrols in the village of Burj Qalawai in south Lebanon, after people start return to their villages following the announcement of an initial ceasefire agreement between the United States and Iran, Monday, June 15, 2026. (AP Photo/Mohammed Zaatari)

Title: Lebanon Israel Iran War Image ID: 26166489966832 Article: A Lebanese soldier patrols in the village of Burj Qalawai in south Lebanon, after people start return to their villages following the announcement of an initial ceasefire agreement between the United States and Iran, Monday, June 15, 2026. (AP Photo/Mohammed Zaatari)

A Lebanese soldier patrols in the village of Burj Qalawai in south Lebanon, after people start return to their villages following the announcement of an initial ceasefire agreement between the United States and Iran, Monday, June 15, 2026. (AP Photo/Mohammed Zaatari)

This is quite a truce or ceasefire going on between the U.S. and Iran. Each side continues to strike the other on a tit-for-tat basis as talks continue. But to anyone with a bent for history, this is not unique.

During the Korean War that began on June 25, 1950, talks between the United Nations, U.S. forces and North Korea went on for two years and 17 days between July 1951 and July 1953, when a truce was reached. During this period about 13,000 U.S. service personnel were killed from a total of about 36,000 war dead. So, these attacks should not be surprising.

The crucial question for the U.S. is what are the leaders of the Islamic Republic in Tehran thinking? It is far from clear that the U.S. understands the view from Tehran and even if that were the case, would it make a difference? Let’s speculate.

Assuming that the so-called divisions among the various Iranian factions are overstated, Tehran must consider itself in a favorable position.

First, Iran’s key negotiators are far more experienced than their U.S. counterparts led by Vice President JD Vance, President Trump’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner, and real estate chum Steve Witkoff. Speaker of the Iranian Parliament Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghachi were part of the 2015 negotiations and are backed up by Kazem Gharibabadi and Majid Takht-Ravanchi, both deputy foreign ministers.

Second, Iran understands that its two most vital strategic levers are the Strait of Hormuz and the ability to influence its neighbors in the Persian Gulf, who are increasingly regretting supporting the war in the first place.

Third, Tehran must see Trump’s power and authority in decline. Following the lead of the House of Representatives, the Senate at first passed legislation invoking the War Powers Act requiring the president to seek authority from Congress to continue military action. After a reportedly expletive filled meeting on Capitol Hill between the president and Republican senators, the vote was reversed.

Yet, that must reflect great uncertainty on the part of a weary Congress and absence of real support for the war, since a large majority of Americans no longer support and indeed want to end the fighting. New allegations about Trump’s involvement with sex offender Jeffrey Epstein, along with the fiasco of a Trump political donor with an uncontested contract overhauling the Reflecting Pool, are also signs of an erosion of his political strength and competence.

Supporters of the president will claim, however, that by dint of personality, Trump was able force the Senate to reverse its course, showing strength and reinforcing who is in charge. And the argument that the U.S. could easily restart the bombing if Iran fails to comply with the 14-point memorandum of understanding gives Trump another option.

But the memorandum has provoked near universal criticism from both Republicans and Democrats. And if hostilities were to resume, clearly the strait would be closed, and Iran could still strike its neighbors in the effort to distance them from the U.S.

Less well understood, the U.S. is probably running out of military targets to strike. If Trump wishes to destroy Iran’s infrastructure, he certainly will generate huge animosity internationally, increasing support for Iran. And Tehran must know the costs of keeping substantial U.S. forces in the region degrades them over time, and that it will require substantial time to restore these units to full capability.

Having just returned from Norfolk, Virginia, I observed USS Ford at its pier. Covered with running rust, Ford showed how corrosive 326 days at sea can be to ships, aircraft and most importantly people. It will probably take months to restore the ship to full readiness and repair all the damage.

Where is this headed? I started and will end with the analogy of the Korean War. How long negotiations will take in this case is unknowable. Continued strikes and counter strikes may be inevitable. Fortunately, if the just-signed agreement between Israel and Lebanon holds, that may remove one irritant in the talks, as Lebanon is prominent in the memorandum and important to Tehran.

Harlan Ullman is senior adviser at Washington’s Atlantic Council, chairman of a private company and principal author of the doctrine of shock and awe. His next book, co-written with Field Marshal The Lord David Richards, former UK chief of defense and due out this fall, is “Who Thinks Best Wins: How Decisive Strategic Thinking Will Prevent Global Chaos.”